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Voluntary Campaign Finance Reform
John Copeland Naglet
Traditional campaign finance reformers have a dream.
Limits on the amount that individuals, political parties, and
other organizations can contribute to candidates. Limits on the
amount that candidates can spend on their campaigns. Limits
on the amount of "soft money" that can be contributed to politi-
cal parties and interest groups for spending on political adver-
tisements, party building, and get-out-the-vote efforts. Restric-
tions on the "issue advocacy" advertisements that address
current political controversies-and often critique the positions
of individual candidates-but stop just short of endorsing one
candidate or another. Television stations that broadcast cam-
paign advertisements free of charge, and that provide more
substantive discussions of the issues raised in an election.
That is the dream. Buckley v. Valeo' is the nightmare.
Buckley and its progeny have applied the First Amendment's
protection of the freedom of speech to invalidate laws contain-
ing many of the provisions desired by traditional campaign fi-
nance reformers. That has made Buckley "the great white
whale" of Supreme Court advocacy,2 targeted by countless re-
form groups, academics, politicians, and newspaper editorials.
The Court, however, has shown little inclination to overrule
Buckley so that the First Amendment may accommodate more
campaign finance reform. Nor is any amendment of the First
Amendment likely to be forthcoming.
t Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School; john.c.nagle.8@nd.edu.
I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in the Symposium on First
Amendment expressive rights held by the Minnesota Law Review on February
9 and 10, 2001. This Essay has benefited immensely from the comments of
Tricia Bellia and Rick Garnett, the work of research librarian Dwight King,
and the research assistance of Chris Schultz.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
2. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH
L. Rev. 311, 311 (describing Buckley as "the great white whale of constitu-
tional law: the more elusive its demise becomes, the greater the intellectual
exertion expended in its pursuit").
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And so, traditional campaign finance reformers have
turned to Plan B. They have encouraged, induced, and pres-
sured political candidates, political parties, interest groups, and
television broadcasters to voluntarily accept the restrictions
that Buckley forbids enacting into law. Such voluntary cam-
paign finance reform has achieved some notable successes.
Most presidential candidates have agreed to limit the amount
that they spent on their campaigns in order to receive cam-
paign finding from the federal government. Senator Hillary
Rodham Clinton and Rick Lazio persuaded their respective po-
litical parties and numerous outside interest groups to not
spend soft money on political advertisements during their re-
cent Senate campaign.3 The success of such agreements, com-
bined with the durability of Buckley, has even led some observ-
ers to express their preference for voluntary efforts at
campaign finance reform. Mark Neumann, who lost a race to
Wisconsin Senator Russell Feingold in 1998, asserted that the
restrictions that he and Feingold agreed to during their cam-
paign "showed that campaign finance reform didn't require
changes in law and was best handled on a voluntary basis."
4
But that view is anathema to traditional campaign finance re-
formers. As Common Cause President Scott Harshberger in-
sisted following the agreement between Clinton and Lazio,
"voluntary bans, however laudable, are not the solution to our
nation's campaign finance woes-no more than voluntary bans
on toxic dumping would qualify as an acceptable environmental
solution."5
That is an image with which I am quite familiar. As I have
written elsewhere, it may be useful to consider campaign fi-
nance problems as those of pollution, in addition to the more
common metaphor of corruption. 6 That idea leads to a number
of lessons for campaign finance that can be gathered from envi-
ronmental law. Harshberger's dismissal of voluntary attempts
to control environmental pollution occurred as President
George W. Bush took office with a record of promoting such
3. See infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
4. Alan. J. Borsuk, Feingold Asks Neumann for Campaign Reform Plan,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 4, 1998, at 3.
5. Common Cause, Statement of Common Cause President Scott Har-
shbarger on New York Senate Race Soft Money Deal, at http://www.common
cause.org/publications/sept00/0925002.htm (Sept. 25, 2000).
6. John Copeland Nagle, Corruption, Pollution, and Politics, 110 YALE
L.J. 293, 316-30 (2000) (reviewing ELIZABETH DREw, THE CORRUPTION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY (1999)).
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policies in Texas.7 Perhaps more interestingly, the view of
campaign spending or contributions as somehow polluting the
political environment can be compared to how we treat the cul-
tural pollution resulting from violent entertainment that has
elicited so many complaints from such diverse personages as
Senator Joseph Lieberman, Tipper Gore, Lynne Cheney, and
Pat Buchanan.
How, then, would the standard campaign finance reform
proposals be viewed if they were applied to violent entertain-
ment instead? Voluntary campaign finance reform is necessary
for the same reason that efforts to combat violent entertain-
ment must be voluntary. The public demands such actions, the
First Amendment prohibits most efforts to write such restric-
tions into the law, so voluntary efforts result. This is why Clin-
ton and Lazio, like other political candidates before them,
agreed to restrictions on their campaign spending that were
not-and possibly could not be-required by the law. It is also
why many states and localities are now offering conditional
government funding of political campaigns as a means of per-
suading candidates to agree to campaign restrictions that the
government cannot impose directly.
8
Voluntary campaign finance reform efforts face two chal-
lenges from opposite perspectives. On the one hand, traditional
campaign finance reformers embrace voluntary efforts cau-
tiously, if at all, lest the need for reform be seen to be satisfied
by what they regard as inadequate measures. Their concern is
that voluntary efforts do not work, or do not work as well as le-
gally compelled requirements. On the other hand, opponents of
standard campaign finance reform proposals object to the char-
acterization of campaign restrictions attached as conditions to
public financing as voluntary. They regard such schemes as
coercive, and thus, contrary to the First Amendment.
Any effort to achieve voluntary campaign finance reform
raises two questions: Is it really voluntary, and does it really
work? In Part I of this Essay, I examine the voluntariness of
7. See, e.g., Jim Yardley, Governor Bush and the Environment; Bush Ap-
proach to Pollution: Preference for Self-Policing, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1999, at
Al.
8. I refer to "government funding," rather than "public funding," for the
reasons explained by Bradley Smith. See Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems
With Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592
(1999) (noting that "'public' funding... is a misnomer" because "[clampaigns
are funded by the public now" through individual contributions).
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"voluntary" campaign finance reform. Agreements like that
reached by Clinton and Lazio last year-what I term "purely
voluntary agreements"-satisfy most legal tests for voluntari-
ness. By contrast, the voluntariness of spending limits and
other campaign restrictions that are imposed as a condition for
receiving government funding of a political campaign-what I
term "governmentally induced agreements"--is more doubtful.
The extant jurisprudence recognizes that Buckley prohibits
governmental actions that are more coercive than inducing, yet
that jurisprudence does not go far enough in identifying coer-
cive governmental spending.
Part II examines the efficacy of voluntary campaign fi-
nance reform. Here the tables are turned. Governmentally in-
duced agreements have generally been successful in achieving
the results sought by campaign finance reformers. Purely vol-
untary agreements, by contrast, present serious questions
about their efficacy. To date, the voluntary agreements demon-
strate a surprising level of success, but the number of such
agreements remains very small. The continued success of gov-
ernmentally induced agreements depends upon adherence to
the fine line of providing enough governmental funding to in-
duce candidates to accept the conditions without becoming co-
ercive. The election of the first presidential candidate to reject
government funding since it was offered in 1976 demonstrates
the fragility of the government funding system. Yet the ability
of Clinton and Lazio to defy the pundits and persuade a dispa-
rate group of supporters to abide by their preferred restrictions
suggests that purely voluntary campaign finance reform holds
more promise than commonly expected. In the end, though,
achievement of both types of voluntary campaign finance re-
form depends on whether the People really want it.
I. THE VOLUNTARINESS OF VOLUNTARY CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM
Candidates, political parties, interest groups, and other in-
terested individuals and organizations need a reason to em-
brace campaign spending limits and other campaign restric-
tions. The most obvious reason is that the law requires it.
Traditional campaign finance reform proposals feature spend-
ing limits, contribution limits, soft money bans, free television
time, and other restrictions on what can be spent and done dur-
ing a political campaign. The proposed McCain-Feingold bill
contained most of these provisions at one time or another dur-
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ing the past several years.9 Similar provisions appear in the
"clean election laws" adopted by a handful of states and local
jurisdictions, and many more states are considering such provi-
sions.
0
But the law cannot achieve many of the fondest desires of
traditional campaign finance reformers. The First Amend-
ment, as applied in Buckley and its progeny, prohibits most le-
gal limits on campaign spending and some legal limits on cam-
paign contributions. The constitutionality of proposals such as
bans on soft money, restrictions on issue advocacy advertise-
ments, and requirements that broadcasters offer free television
time continue to be contested. The greatest dilemma, though,
is that the amount spent on today's political campaigns is the
greatest complaint of traditional campaign finance reformers,
and spending is exactly what is so difficult to regulate under
the First Amendment.
So campaign finance reform must be voluntary because
Buckley holds that the First Amendment prohibits the govern-
ment from regulating many aspects of campaign finance. Why,
then, would someone voluntarily agree to do what the law can-
not require it to do? One reason is public pressure. A candi-
date may decline a contribution or refrain from airing a par-
ticular advertisement if he or she fears that the money or tactic
will result in a loss of voter support. Money offers another im-
petus for voluntary campaign decisions. If the government
promises to provide public financing, then a restriction becomes
more attractive. Another reason is the threat of government
support for an opponent. Government financing schemes con-
tain such carrots and sticks to induce candidates to renounce
certain disfavored campaign funding or tactics in favor of the
rules accompanying public funding.
9. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong.
(2001) (citing the most recent version of the McCain-Feingold proposal);
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RIcHARD H. PILDEs, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRAcY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCEss 662-63 (1998)
(describing the 1997 version of the McCain-Feingold proposal).
10. See Nagle, supra note 6, at 317 n.123 (citing the state clean election
statutes). See generally Public Campaign, Annotated Model Legislation for
Clean Money Campaign Reform, available at http-//www.publiccampaign.org
modelbill/fullbill.txt (Dec. 1997) (illustrating a model clean election law); Pub-
lie Campaign, Clean Money Campaign Reform, available at http:J/www.public
campaign.org/cleanmoney.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2001) (providing an over-
view of clean election laws).
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Efforts to secure either kind of voluntary campaign finance
reform involve several different actors and several different
kinds of restrictions. The affected actors include political can-
didates, political donors, political parties and other interest
groups, and television broadcasters. The restrictions can be
grouped into three categories. Spending limits operate to limit
the total amount that a candidate may spend during an elec-
tion campaign, or the amount that a candidate may spend on
television advertisements or other specified activities, or the to-
tal that a political party or other interested group may spend
on the campaign. Contribution limits restrict the total amount
that an individual or organization can contribute to a candidate
or to a party, or they impose more specific restrictions on per-
missible sources of funds. A third category of restrictions relate
to television coverage of a campaign, including requirements
that broadcasters provide free time to candidates or that the
media increase and improve its own coverage of election cam-
paigns.
The question raised by Buckley is which of these agree-
ments is voluntary. The law determines voluntariness differ-
ently in various contexts. Waivers of the right to counsel are
voluntary if they are intentional and knowing. I x A Miranda
warning must precede any confession of criminal activity before
the courts will treat a confession as voluntary. 12 Prayer can be
voluntary for those who are praying, but nonetheless imper-
missible because it coerces others. 13
What constitutes a voluntary campaign finance agreement
is less certain. Much campaign finance reform is denominated
voluntary even as it is included in comprehensive legislative
enactments. By contrast, Bradley Smith has observed that
"[t]he only real 'voluntary' spending limit comes when those
who care about politics decide not to spend any more-
everything else is a coercive limit on political speech, else it
need not be included in the law."14 Perhaps the best way to de-
termine a writer's view is simply to look at whether the word
11. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.").
12. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000) (stating that
Miranda warnings, and not a totality-of-the-circumstances test, guide the vol-
untariness inquiry).
13. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-95 (1992) (describing how a
graduation prayer coerces those who object to a prayer).
14. Smith, supra note 8, at 627.
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"voluntary" is surrounded by quotation marks. 15 With this inmind, I will briefly consider the voluntariness of purely volun-
tary campaign finance reform agreements, then address the
more controversial question of the voluntariness of governmen-
tally induced campaign finance agreements.
A. PURELY VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS
The purely voluntary campaign agreements like the one
reached by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Rick Lazio are moti-
vated by media pressure, candidate challenge, or fear of elec-
toral rebuke. Government action, in other words, is not re-
sponsible for such agreements. Nonetheless, it should be
remembered that the motivations for purely voluntary agree-
ments can be regarded as involuntary in other contexts. For
example, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court invalidated a prayer of-
fered at a high school graduation ceremony because "the gov-
ernment may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy
than it may use more direct means."16 Outside of that context,
though, public pressure on private individuals does not render
any resulting action involuntary.
B. GOVERNMENTALLY INDUCED AGREEMENTS
Governmentally induced campaign agreements involve the
government offering a benefit in exchange for the recipient's
acceptance of restrictions. Such a quid pro quo is not abso-
lutely necessary. The government could provide funds to politi-
cal candidates with no strings attached, thereby avoiding all
controversy about the voluntariness of the arrangement.17 No
government has been willing to extend such unconditional gen-
erosity, which itself raises the initial hint that any government
financing of elections will come at a price.
15. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of
Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 667, 669 (1997) (placing "voluntary" in
quotation marks).
16. 505 U.S. at 594.
17. See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 563, 568 (1999) (observing that "spending limits are not essen-
tial to public fimding, and many of the benefits of public funding in promoting
competitive elections and reducing the role of private wealth could be secured
without spending limits"); Smith, supra note 8, at 628 n.112 (noting that only
the ACLU has advocated government spending without any attached limits on
contributions or spending).
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Government campaign funding is the most common benefit
offered to those who agree to participate in the government's
program, but the government has also offered free television
time, tax credits, franking privileges, statements in official
voter guides, reduced reporting requirements, and notations on
the ballot.18 Candidates accepting the government's offer also
benefit from additional funding and increased spending and
contribution limits that are triggered if a candidate who
chooses not to accept the agreement spends more than a speci-
fied amount on his or her campaign.19 The restrictions imposed
as a condition for receiving all of those benefits include spend-
ing caps, restrictions on the purpose and timing of campaign
18. See, e.g., Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov'tl Ethics & Election Practices, 205
F.3d 445, 451-52 (1st Cir. 2000) (detailing the money provided from the Maine
Clean Election Fund to participating candidates, the waiver of certain report-
ing requirements, and intangible benefits associated with less fundraising
time and fewer questions of access to contributors); Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiSte-
fano, 4 F.3d 26, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1993) (describing the government funding and
free time on public television provided to Rhode Island gubernatorial candi-
dates); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 920 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (noting that
Kentucky offers candidates two government dollars for every privately raised
dollar); Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770, 787-88 (Or. 1997) (explaining that
Oregon offers campaign contributors a tax credit when they contribute to par-
ticipating candidates and indicates in the official voters' pamphlet whether a
candidate agreed to limit his or her campaign spending). See generally
ELIZABETH DANIEL, SUBSIDIZING POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: THE VARIETY &
VALUES OF PUBLIC FINANCING 3-5 (2000) (providing an overview of the gov-
ernment benefits offered to candidates).
19. E.g., Daggett, 205 F.3d at 451 (explaining that Maine provides partici-
pating candidates with an additional dollar of government funds for every dol-
lar spent over the initial disbursement by opposing candidates who are not
participating in the program or by independent groups opposing the partici-
pating candidate, with a limit of double the initial distribution of government
funds); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 1998) (indicating that
when a non-participating candidate collects more than $1.8 million in cam-
paign funds, Kentucky lifts the spending limits imposed on participating can-
didates, matches any additional funds raised by the participating candidate on
a two-for-one basis, and lifts a prohibition on fundraising during the twenty-
eight days before the election), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999); Day v. Hola-
han, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing a Minnesota provision that
increases the campaign spending limits applicable to participating candidates
by the amount spent by independent groups opposing their candidacy); Cal.
Prolife Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (noting
that California's Proposition 208 imposed contribution limits on participating
candidates that were twice as high as the contribution limits applicable to
non-participating candidates), affd, 164 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999); Wilkinson,
876 F. Supp. at 921 (explaining that the Kentucky contribution limits for par-
ticipating candidates were $500 per person per year, whereas non-
participating candidates could only accept contributions of $100 per person per
year).
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spending, limitations on the source of campaign money, report-
ing requirements, and restrictions on the content of advertise-
ments.20 The combined package of benefits and burdens-of
carrots and sticks-varies from one program to another.
Buckley upheld the government financing system estab-
lished by Congress for presidential elections.21 Under that sys-
tem, major presidential candidates are entitled to as much as
$70 million of government funds for their campaigns if they
agree not to spend more than the government gives them.
22
The Court sustained that approach in a footnote, explaining
that Congress may engage in public financing of election cam-
paigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an
agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure
limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size
of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo
private fundraising and accept public funding.
23
Since Buckley, the lower courts have generally upheld the
voluntariness of conditional public financing schemes. For ex-
ample, in Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez,24 the Eighth Circuit upheld
Minnesota's scheme for financing state elections. 25 The Minne-
sota statute provides government funding and a tax refund in
exchange for the acceptance of spending limits that vary from
just over $20,000 for state legislative races to more than $1.6
20. E.g., Daggett, 205 F.3d at 451 (indicating that Maine prohibits par-
ticipating candidates from raising or spending any money from sources other
than the state's clean election fund); Vote Choice, Inc., 4 F.3d at 30 (noting
that fimds provided by Rhode Island may only be used for certain enumerated
purposes); Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 920 (explaining that "[plublicly-funded
slates agree to limit private contributions they accept in each of the primary
and general elections to a total of $600,000"); City of Seattle v. Washington,
668 P.2d 1266, 1268 n.2 (Wash. 1983) (describing a city campaign contract
that requires participating candidates to provide no more than $1,000 of their
own money to their campaign, spend no more than $150,000 in a mayoral elec-
tion or $50,000 in races for other city offices, spend no more than 75% of all
funds by the date of the primary, use campaign contributions for direct cam-
paign purposes only, return half of unspent money to the city, comply with re-
porting requirements, and abide by the legal decisions of the elections admin-
istrator). See generally DANIEL, supra note 18, at 9-11 (summarizing the
restrictions imposed on candidates).
21. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (per curiam).
22. See infra text accompanying note 75 (describing the presidential fi-
nancing scheme).
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65 (per curiam).
24. 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996).
25. Id. at 1557.
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million for gubernatorial races. 26 If, however, a candidate who
does not accept government funding spends or accepts contri-
butions beyond a set amount, then the spending cap is lifted. 27
That system was challenged by two state legislative candidates
as contrary to the free speech guarantees of the First Amend-
ment. The state's case for the voluntariness of the campaign
funding agreement was complicated by the existence of a rather
striking statement in the legislative history. One of the state
senate's leading proponents of the government funding scheme
explained that it was to operate not as a carrot, nor even as a
stick, but rather as "a real heavy club" to encourage participa-
tion.28 Nonetheless, a majority of the court upheld that system
as voluntary, emphasizing the "relative balance between the
benefits provided to publicly financed candidates and the re-
strictions the candidates must accept."29 Alternately, the ma-
jority determined that the system would be constitutional even
if it was involuntary because it satisfied strict scrutiny.30
Judge Lay dissented because he concluded that the scheme
chilled protected speech. 31
Other courts have followed the general approach outlined
in Rosenstiel. The First Circuit has been especially insistent on
the constitutionality of similar government induced campaign
finance agreements. In Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano,32 the
court agreed with the constitutional importance of the volun-
tariness inquiry, advising that "there is a point at which regu-
latory incentives stray beyond the pale, creating disparities so
26. Id. at 1546.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1551 (quoting Weber v. Heaney, 995 F.2d 872, 877 n.7 (8th Cir.
1993) (quoting Minnesota Congressional Campaign Reform Act, 1990: Hearing
on S. 577 Before the Subcomm. on Elections and Ethics, 76th Leg. (Mar. 1,
1989) (statement of Senator Marty))).
29. Id. at 1550-51 (concluding that the scheme "achieves the rough pro-
portionality necessary to entice, but not coerce, candidate participation"). The
Rosenstiel court finessed the inconvenient "real heavy club" statement as the
mere musings of one legislator on a different bill, and it dismissed the Weber
court's own troubled account of that statement as dicta. Id. at 1551-52.
30. Id. at 1553.
31. Id. at 1561 (Lay, J., dissenting) (concluding that "Minnesota's current
campaign financing scheme, including the spending limits waiver and the re-
tention of the public subsidy, as well as the contribution refund, directly chills
the exercise of a privately financed candidate's constitutional right to unfet-
tered political speech" (footnote omitted)).
32. 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993).
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profound that they become impermissibly coercive."33 The
court then upheld the challenged Rhode Island scheme because
it achieved "a rough proportionality" between the benefits and
burdens offered to candidates, even though the scheme "is not
in exact balance."34 Seven years later, the court upheld the
Maine Clean Election Act in Daggett v. Commission on Gov-
ernmental Ethics and Election Practices.35 There the court
asked a somewhat different question: "[Whether the elements
of the system, considered as a whole, create a situation where it
is so beneficial to join up and so detrimental to eschew public
funding that it creates coercion and renders a candidate's
choice to pursue public funding essentially involuntary."36 The
court's answer, though, was the same: the system was volun-
tary.37 Most courts have agreed that various governmentally
induced campaign finance agreements are voluntary and thus
constitutional, though a handful of cases (including two Eighth
Circuit decisions prior to Rosenstiel) come out the other way.3
8
The cases are not sufficiently attentive to the voluntariness
problem inherent in the conditions imposed upon government
funding of political campaigns. The lack of voluntariness can
be illustrated by the contrasting perspectives of the govern-
ment providing the money and the candidate accepting the re-
strictions. From the government's perspective, the focus of a
33. Id. at 38.
34. Id. at 39. The court also expressed its suspicion "that very few cam-
paign financing schemes ever achieve perfect equipoise." Id.
35. 205 F.3d 445, 472 (lst Cir. 2000).
36. Id. at 466.
37. Id. at 472.
38. Compare Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 1998) (sustain-
ing a Kentucky government financing scheme except for a provision banning
candidates from contributing to their own campaigns in the final weeks of an
election), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp.
916 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (denying a preliminary injunction against another Ken-
tucky government campaign funding statute); Republican Natl Comm. v.
FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding the federal Presiden-
tial Campaign Funding Act), affd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980); and Vannatta v. Keis-
ling, 931 P.2d 770, 773-74 (Or. 1997) (sustaining much of an Oregon govern-
ment financing initiative), with FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480,
482 (1985) (striking down the federal Presidential Campaign Funding Act's
limitation on independent expenditures); Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71
F.3d 1422, 1423 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating the expenditure ceilings con-
tained in a Missouri government funding initiative); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d
1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994) (striking down a Minnesota statute tying govern-
ment funding to restrictions on expenditures by outside groups); and Cal. Pro-
life Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1299 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (invalidat-
ing variable contribution limits contained in a California initiative).
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voluntary campaign finance program should be upon the fund-
ing, not the conditions. That is how conditional government
spending operates in other contexts. Consider federal highway
funding. Congress provides billions of dollars annually to
states who desire financial assistance in building highways and
other roads. Congress has attached a number of conditions to
the state receipt of that money. States that accept such money
must establish a drinking age of twenty-one years old, a provi-
sion that the Court upheld in South Dakota v. Dole.39 Addi-
tionally, states are required to establish a 0.8% blood-alcohol
level standard test for driving under the influence of.alcohol.40
These restrictions demonstrate that Congress pursues other
policy goals besides the construction of more roads via federal
spending. But the primary purpose of the federal spending re-
mains the construction of roads, not federal regulation of state
drinking laws. In other words, Congress is highly unlikely to
spend billions of dollars just so it has the authority to impose
restrictions on alcohol consumption. Or, to take another recent
example, there is little reason to believe that the federal gov-
ernment spends billions of dollars on education each year sim-
ply to persuade states to waive their Eleventh Amendmentimmunity from suits to comply with federal obligations respect-
ing disabled children. 41
The opposite is true of most government campaign finance
programs. Reformers explicitly defend government spending as
a means of imposing restrictions that the government could not
impose directly because of the First Amendment.42 Most nota-
bly, the First Amendment prohibits most government campaign
expenditure limitations imposed on political candidates (and
other parties), yet spending caps are a primary condition on the
provision of government money to candidates. The purpose of
such programs is not to provide funds to encourage speech, but
39. 483 U.S. 203,212 (1987).
40. Pub. L. No. 106-346, 106th Cong. (2000); see also Remarks on the Es-
tablishment of a National Drunk Driving Standard, 36 WEEKLY COMP, PRES.
DOCS. 2578 (2000).
41. See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (holding that Arkansas waived sovereign immunity when it accepted
federal funding).
42. BURT NEUBORNE, A SURVEY OF EXISTING EFFORTS TO REFORM THE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM 11 (1997) (explaining that "[many reformers be-
lieve that the greatest value of a subsidy approach is that it permits the gov-
ernment to place strings on the candidates who accept the subsidies").
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rather to discourage speech through the attached conditions.
43
The fact that Buckley endorsed government spending programs
that encourage speech thus becomes inapposite.
There are, however, instances where the government fi-
nancing is the principal motivation, rather than any attached
conditions. The provision of government funding frees candi-
dates from the time otherwise spent on fundraising and allays
concerns about the influence purchased by campaign contribu-
tors. These concerns are legitimate, and they can support a
state's decision to finance political campaigns. But they are
less persuasive in justifying spending and contribution restric-
tions, especially variable limits that allow more contributions
to and spending by participating candidates than non-
participating candidates. For example, the need to save candi-
dates from time spent fundraising can be achieved by a "floors
without ceilings" approach which assures that all candidates
enjoy a sufficient amount of funding while allowing candidates
to raise and spend more money if they choose to do so.44 The
ability to guarantee a fixed minimum amount of funding re-
sponds to the studies indicating that a candidate needs a
threshold amount of funding to be competitive, rather than an
equal or greater amount of money than one's opponent. 45 The
other purpose of government induced campaign finance re-
form-to reduce or eliminate the perceived corrupting influence
of contributors-can be addressed much more directly. Buckley
permits most contribution limits, so the vehicle of public fund-
ing is wholly unnecessary to impose such limits. In both in-
stances, the ability to achieve the desired purposes via means
besides conditions attached to government financing indicates
that the expenditure or contribution restrictions are not essen-
tial to the government's scheme.
43. See Constitution and Campaign Reform: Hearing Before the Senate
Rules and Admin. Comm., 106th Cong. (2000), available at http-J/rules.senate.
gov/hearings/32200bev.htm (Mar. 22, 2000) (statement of Lillian R. BeVier,
Professor, University of Virginia School of Law) (distinguishing between the
purpose of the government spending upheld in Buckley and proposed condi-
tional government campaign funding that will "reduce substantially the quan-
tity of campaign speech. Indeed, that must be their purpose .... ").
44. Briffault, supra note 17, at 578 (describing the "floors without ceil-
ings" approach); Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather Than
Level-Down: Towards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. &
POL. 211, 275-94 (1984) (detailing the virtues of a level-up approach).
45. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 569 (suggesting that possession of a
critical mass of fimds is more important than actual funding parity).
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The ubiquity of conditional government campaign funding,
as opposed to funding without such conditions, is best ex-
plained by the equality argument for campaign finance reform.
The equalization of the resources available to competing candi-
dates is a central theme in much of the literature advocating
reform.46 That argument is also scattered through the cases
sustaining various restrictions attached to government cam-
paign finding.47 Thus government funding alone is not suffi-
cient if candidates who decline the government's money remain
capable of outspending candidates accepting the money. That
is why government spending schemes contain triggers, cap
gaps, and other provisions aimed at candidates who do not ac-
cept government funding. It is also why the First Circuit ex-
pressed incredulity at a non-participating candidate's objec-
tions to such provisions, ridiculing the contrary argument as "a
claim of a First Amendment right to outraise and outspend an
opponent."48
The inclusion of such restrictions applicable to candidates
who do not accept government funding may be constitutional,
but it is hard to characterize the resulting decisions as volun-
tary. The Spending Power faces few limits. The Supreme
Court has not invalidated an exercise of the Spending Power
since the New Deal.49 The Eighth Circuit recently sustained a
condition attached to a state's receipt of $250 million of federal
education funds as constitutional, over the dissent of four
judges who viewed that inducement as working an effectively
involuntary decision.50 On the other hand, the Supreme Court
46. See generally Symposium, Money, Politics, and Equality, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1603 (1999) (analyzing the equalization of finding argument).
47. See, e.g., Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov'tl Ethics & Election Practices, 205
F.3d 445, 470 (1st Cir. 2000) (acknowledging "the state's goal of distributing
roughly proportionate funding, albeit with a limit, to publicly funded candi-
dates"); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that an expenditure cap gap satisfies strict scrutiny because it "removes the
disincentive a candidate may have to participate in the public financing sys-
tem because of the candidate's fear of being grossly outspent by a well-
financed, privately funded opponent").
48. Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464.
49. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77 (1936) (holding that the
Agricultural Adjustment Act was not a legitimate exercise of the Spending
Power but rather an attempted exercise of congressional regulatory power un-
authorized by the Commerce Clause); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216
(1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing Butler as "the last case in which
this Court struck down an Act of Congress as beyond the authority granted by
the Spending Clause").
50. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
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has invalidated conditions on government subsidies to legal
services, public broadcasting, and university publications as
contrary to the First Amendment.5' Still, the prevailing rule
appears to be that Congress is afforded wide latitude in impos-
ing conditions on the acceptance of federal funds, even though
the resulting choices would not be treated as voluntary in other
contexts.
Yet none of the decided cases, and none of the conditional
funding programs, involve an instance in which the restrictions
are regarded as more important than the funds themselves.
That distinction could threaten the voluntariness of some of the
restrictions attached to government campaign funding. The
concern is further illustrated by imagining the other kinds of
restrictions that a state could decide to attach to government
campaign funding. Suppose that the people of a state wanted
to adopt an alternative measure designed to reduce the impact
of campaign contributors on members of Congress: term limits.
The imposition of term limits could address the perception of
the illicit influence of campaign contributors by freeing legisla-
tors and other office holders from the temptation to remain in
the good graces of contributors to future campaigns. The Court
has held that a state is constitutionally barred from imposing
term limits on members of Congress,52 just like the Court has
invalidated most efforts to regulate campaign expenditures. A
sufficiently broad view of the Spending Power would allow a
state to impose such term limits, though, if they were included
as a condition upon government funding of a congressional
campaign. Such a law would be likely to survive under the ex-
isting Spending Clause jurisprudence, but the purpose of the
(holding 6-4 that the Spending Power authorized Congress to require a state
to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity in return for receiving any fed-
eral education funds). The dissent insisted,
[T]he proportion of federal funds for education in Arkansas here
placed at risk by the federal scheme (100%), the amount of those
funds (some $250,000,000), and the difficulty of making up for the
loss of those funds if the State elects not to waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to Rehabilitation Act claims all
lead to the conclusion that pressure has turned into compulsion and
that the waiver given by the State is therefore unenforceable.
Id. at 1083 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
51. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001); Sullivan, su-
pra note 2, at 317 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
831-32 (1995), and FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84
(1984)).
52. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995).
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government's spending program might yet prove to affect the
voluntariness inquiry.
The candidate's perspective reveals another voluntariness
problem. Richard Briffault has explained that government
campaign finance programs are voluntary if "each candidate
has the opportunity to decide whether, on balance, public fund-
ing without limits would help or hinder her campaign and may
opt in or out accordingly."53 A candidate, in other words,
should decide whether the carrot offered by the government is
sufficiently attractive to accept restrictions that accompany the
funding. But many government programs affirmatively penal-
ize a candidate for not accepting the government's offer. If a
candidate declines to participate in the government's program
and spends more than a specified amount of private funds dur-
ing the campaign, then the government provides additional
funds to an opposing participating candidate and removes the
spending caps that otherwise apply to that candidate. Some
laws even create "cap gaps," which impose more stringent con-
tribution or expenditure limits on candidates who do not agree
to the government's conditions.
54
These penalties render such schemes involuntary. As
Judge Lay explained in dissent in Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez,55
When a candidate voluntarily abandons all the benefits of public sub-
sidies (including the contribution refund) to exercise her constitu-
tional right, it is a voluntary choice. When such a choice is made,
however, Minnesota's campaign finance scheme adds disincentives
which make a privately financed candidate worse off than she other-
wise would be. Her publicly financed opponent, who has chosen to re-
ceive a public subsidy, can now keep the public subsidy, obtain the
benefit of the contribution refund for all past and future contribu-
tions, and spend without limit.
56
It is as if Congress limits the amount of a state's own funds
that the state can spend on highways if it refuses federal high-
way funds. The Spending Power argument that supports con-
ditions on non-participating political candidates could also en-
53. Briffault, supra note 17, at 578.
54. See supra note 19.
55. 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996).
56. Id. at 1561 (Lay, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Joseph E.
Finley, Note, The Pitfalls of Contingent Public Financing in Congressional
Campaign Spending Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 735, 751 (1995) (explaining that
"[u]nlike the traditional conditional benefits program, where the nonpartici-
pating candidate is free to spend without risk once participation is declined,
contingent public financing provisions... continue to burden the nonpartici-
pating candidate even after his choice has been made").
1824 [Vol. 85:1809
2001] VOLUNTARY CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 1825
able Congress to force a state to choose between federally-
funded highways-with their attached conditions-or under-
funded, pothole-laden highways.
The First Circuit rejected the distinction between condi-
tions that penalize non-participants and conditions that benefit
participants in Vote Choice, Inc. v. Distefano.57 Judge Selya as-
serted that "the distinction... between denying the carrot and
striking with the stick is, in many contexts, more semantic
than substantive."58 He then observed that the challengers to
the Rhode Island law had not produced any evidence that the
state's cap gap-which authorized participating candidates to
accept contributions of $2,000 per donor, while non-
participating candidates were limited to $1,000 per donor-was
designed to penalize non-participating candidates. 59 Such evi-
dence is readily available in other cases, though, where a state
affirmatively reduced a preexisting contribution limit when it
instituted a government campaign financing system.60 The
creation of the higher contribution limit also contradicts the
state's assertion that a lower limit is necessary to vindicate the
state's interest in opposing the perceived corrupting influence
of campaign contributions.
6'
The analogy between campaign finance as a problem of pol-
lution and violent entertainment as cultural pollution raises
further questions. Could Congress adopt a scheme of public fi-
nancing for "clean" movies that offers substantial funding to
producers who agree not to produce violent entertainment?
Could Congress provide additional public financing to produc-
ers of "clean" movies whenever another producer spends more
than a specified amount on a violent movie? Could Congress
subsidize the broadcast of public service advertisements en-
couraging people to go see particular "clean" movies? Such
steps would be comparable to the ways in which the govern-
57. 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993).
58. Id. at 38.
59. Id. at 39.
60. See Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov'tl Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445, 452 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that "[reduced limits on contributions by indi-
viduals and groups to political candidates were enacted simultaneously with
the [Maine Clean Election] Act by the voter referendum and effectively apply
only to non-participating candidates").
61. See Cal. Prolife Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (E.D.
Cal. 1998) (invalidating a lower contribution limit imposed on non-
participating candidates for this reason).
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ment helps fund political campaigns, yet any governmental in-
volvement in the production of entertainment is controversial.
The outcry in response to the pro-bono match program of
the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign illustrates the
typical reaction to conditional government spending involving
the entertainment industry. In 1998, Congress authorized the
spending of nearly $200 million annually for a national media
campaign aimed at discouraging illegal drug use.
62 Part of
those funds were to be used for "entertainment industry col-
laborations to fashion antidrug messages" in movies, television,
music, and other media.63 But those funds were conditioned by
the statutory requirement that an equivalent amount of non-
federal funds or in-kind contributions be provided by the recipi-
ents of the federal money.64 Hence the entertainment industry
was obligated to provide in-kind contributions in order to re-
ceive the spending on federal anti-drug public service an-
nouncements. The resulting pro-bono program counted pro-
gramming with an anti-drug message as satisfying the
statutory requirement. 65 But a January 2000 report in the
online journal Salon characterized the arrangement as a gov-
ernment effort to control the content of popular television pro-
gramming.66 As Salon put it, "Under the sway of the office of
President Clinton's drug czar, Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, some
of America's most popular shows-including 'ER,' 'Beverly Hills
90210,' 'Chicago Hope,' 'The Drew Carey Show' and '7th
Heaven'-have filled their episodes with anti-drug pitches to
cash in on a complex advertising subsidy."67 The report
promptly elicited outraged charges that the government was
62. 21 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (Supp. IV 1995-1999) (directing the Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy to "conduct a national media campaign... for the
purpose of reducing and preventing drug abuse among young people in the
United States"); 21 U.S.C. § 1804 (Supp. IV 1995-1999) (authorizing the
spending of $195 million for each fiscal year from 1999 to 2002).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(H) (Supp. IV 1995-1999).
64. 21 U.S.C. § 1802(c) (Supp. IV 1995-1999).
65. See generally OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
NATIONAL YOUTH MEDIA ANTI-DRUG MEDIA CAMPAIGN: PRO-BONO MATCH
PROGRAM AND GUIDELINES 3 (2000), available at http://www.mediacampaign.
org/about/guidelines/probono.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2001) (summarizing the
pro-bono program).
66. Daniel Forbes, Prime-Time Propaganda, SALON (Jan. 13, 2000), at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/01/13/drugs/index.html
67. Id. The article credited the pro-bono program with providing as much
as $25 million to television broadcasters in the past year and a half. Id.
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violating the First Amendment,68 and congressional testimony
from General McCaffrey denying that the government was in-
terfering with the creative process or requiring changes in pro-
gram content.69 The reminder that the entertainment industry
could voluntarily decide whether or not to accept the govern-
ment's money in the first place, so common when government
campaign funding occurs, was nowhere to be seen.
II. THE EFFICACY OF VOLUNTARY CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM
Voluntary efforts to control air and water pollution are
sometimes viewed as an alternative to governmental regula-
tion, with the assumption that whichever technique works best
should prevail. But voluntary efforts to control violent enter-
tainment and other cultural pollution are seen as necessary be-
cause the Constitution does not permit anything else. That
would seem to be the predicament with respect to campaign fi-
nance reform, too, with traditional reformers painting volun-
tary campaign finance reform as necessary only until that day
when an enlightened Court overrules Buckley and allows le-
gally enforceable measures. Nonetheless, there are some sug-
gestions that the efficacy of voluntary efforts could determine
the propriety of governmental regulation. Justice Breyer has
indicated that the appropriate constitutional standard might
depend upon whether it allows whatever campaign finance re-
form is necessary. 70 This perspective echoes Senator Lieber-
68. See, e.g., Elizabeth Jensen & Eric Lichtblau, White House Defends
Anti-Drug, TV Tie, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000, at A15 (quoting Ira Glasser, ex-
ecutive director of the ACLU, describing the program as "unconstitutional");
Howard Kurtz & Sharon Waxman, White House Cut Anti-Drug Deal With TV,
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2000, at A10 (quoting Andrew Jay Schwartzman, presi-
dent of the Media Access Project, as saying that "[tihe idea of the government
attempting to influence public opinion covertly is reprehensible beyond
words").
69. Evaluating the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
of the House Gov't Reform Comm., 106th Cong. (2000), available at http'l/www.
house.gov/reform/cj/hearings/00.07.11IMcCaffrey.htm (July 11, 2000) (state-
ment of Barry R. McCaffrey) ("Recent media reports has [sic] raised two ques-
tions: Is the federal government interfering with the creative process? We are
not. Is the financial leverage of the media campaign being used to require
changes in program content? The answer is no.").
70. See Nixon v. Sbrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 405 (2000) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (suggesting that "the Constitution would require us to recon-
sider Buckley" if that decision "denies the political branches sufficient leeway
to enact comprehensive solutions to the problems posed by campaign finance").
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man's admonition that cultural polluters would be given six
months to clean up their act before the government would step
in to regulate violent entertainment.71 These suggestions not-
withstanding, one of the principal questions about voluntary
campaign finance reform is whether it works.
A. GOVERNMENTALLY INDUCED CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Any government campaign financing scheme confronts a
fundamental tension between providing enough incentives to
get candidates to join but not so many incentives that it be-
comes coercive. If all candidates participate, then the program
looks involuntary. If no candidates participate, the program is
useless. The middle-ground is difficult to find.
This is illustrated by the federal program for funding
presidential elections. Presidential candidates are eligible for
matching government funds during the primary elections.
72
Only those contributions of $250 or less are matched, though,
and funding is discontinued if a candidate receives fewer than
ten percent of the vote in two consecutive primaries. 73 During
the general election, the Republican and Democratic candidates
can receive nearly $70 million in government funds-provided
that they agree not to spend more than that amount.74 Candi-
dates of minor parties that received at least five percent of the
vote in the most recent presidential election are eligible for a
lesser amount of federal funds.
75
Most presidential candidates have accepted the govern-
ment's offer since it was first extended in 1976. But the grow-
ing number of presidential candidates who have declined gov-
71. See The Marketing of Violence to Children: Hearing Before the Senate
Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://www.senate.gov/
-commerce/hearings/09131ie.pdf (Sept. 13, 2000) (testimony of Senator Joe
Lieberman) (stating that "Vice President Gore and I believe that vigorous self-
regulation is the best solution to this problem, and we hope these entertain-
ment industries step up to the plate in the next six months.... But if these
industries fail to act, and if they market adult-rated products to kids in viola-
tion of their own standards, then they must be held accountable" through the
regulation of false and deceptive advertising).
72. See generally ANTHONY CORRADO, PAYING FOR PRESIDENTS: PUBLIC
FINANCING IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1993) (describing the presidential financ-
ing scheme); NEUBORNE, supra note 42, at 12 (same); Federal Election Com-
mittee, Public Funding of Presidential Elections (1996), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/pubfind.htm (same).
73. See sources cited supra note 72.
74. See sources cited supra note 72.
75. See sources cited supra note 72.
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ernment funding includes Rose Perot in 1992, Steve Forbes in
1996, and George W. Bush and Steve Forbes (again) in 2000.76
Experience with state government financing schemes displays
a similar ambivalence. Between 1993 and 1996, two-thirds of
the gubernatorial candidates in states with government fund-
ing schemes accepted the money; one-third declined.7 7 The
failure of prominent-and successful-candidates to participate
in the presidential program has prompted Richard Briffault to
ask, "Can it be said that public funding works if, notwithstand-
ing the availability of public funding, a growing number of ma-
jor candidates prefer to rely on private funds? 7 8
There are several reasons why candidates decline govern-
ment funds. Professor Briffault observes that "[piresidential
public funding is in trouble because public funds are provided
at inadequate levels."7 9 Challengers are especially leery of
agreeing to campaign restrictions when their incumbent oppo-
nents already enjoy much greater recognition among the vot-
ers.80 The failure to regulate spending by outside groups
prompted several candidates for San Francisco's Board of Su-
pervisors to decline government money because of the condi-
tions attached to it.81 Concerns about the timeliness of gov-
76. Briffaul% supra note 17, at 584.
77. MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM:
SOBERING CA1,APAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 62
(1998).
78. Briffault, supra note 17, at 586.
79. Id.; accord Smith, supra note 8, at 596 (explaining that "[w]hen subsi-
dies are set too low, many candidates will be reluctant to join voluntary gov-
ernment financing schemes, figuring that they can raise more money and run
a more effective campaign on private contributions").
80. See Campaign Finance Revision: Soft Money: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Rules and Admin. Comm., 105th Cong., (May 14, 1997) (testimony of
Lamar Alexander) (asserting that government financing "creates an unlevel
playing field by favoring incumbents"); Smith, supra note 8, at 608 (explaining
why "low spending tends to penalize challengers"). But see Patrick D. Donnay
& Graham P. Ramsden, Public Financing of Legislative Elections: Lessons
from Minnesota, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 351, 362-63 (1995) (empirical study reject-
ing the claim that government funding helped incumbents). Additionally, Pro-
fessor Smith has observed that "spending caps will likely be set too low" in
government funding schemes because "incumbents, who want to be reelected,
will set the levels of the caps." Smith, supra note 8, at 606. This has been
true historically, but the increasing number of ballot initiatives that establish
government funding schemes offers some solace for challengers.
81. See Edward Epstein, Spending Cap Lifted in Second S.F. Race: Super-
visor Candidate Won'tAbide by Limits, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26,2000, at A15.
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ernment funds has also led some candidates to turn to alterna-
tive sources of private funding.
82
The lesson is that government funding schemes can be
made to work, but it remains questionable whether the public,
legislators, and reformers are willing to take the steps that
would make such programs more successful. The two ways of
encouraging participation in government campaign funding
schemes are obvious: provide more money or impose fewer con-
ditions. It is much more questionable, though, whether tax-
payers will provide more money or whether reformers will
agree to fewer conditions. And even if that occurred, the initial
tension between a program that is appealing to candidates but
not so appealing to become involuntary looms as a threat to any
plan. There is a balance that is both attractive to candidates
and voluntary, but that balance is quite delicate, and it will not
be easily achieved.
B. PURELY VOLUNTARY CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Candidates, political parties, and other interested groups
routinely agree not to engage in certain activities that the law
permits. No candidate wants to be accused of receiving funds
from an unpopular source. The ad hoc decisions refusing such
funds reflect the power that voluntary decisions can have in re-
sponding to campaign finance concerns. But those concerns
demand more than isolated actions affecting only a few of the
countless possible campaigning decisions available to candi-
dates and others. Thus any claim that voluntary measures can
substitute for legal regulation demands a more systematic ap-
proach. The kinds of voluntary actions that would be necessary
are illustrated by three recent campaigns for the United States
Senate, a White House advisory committee's recommendation
directed at television coverage of elections, and a comprehen-
sive effort to secure better election campaigns in Minnesota.
The lessons of these efforts show both the promise and the limi-
tations of purely voluntary campaign finance reform agree-
ments.
82. See Patrick McGreevy & Sue Fox, Hayden Takes Heat for Turning
Down City's Match, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at B1 (reporting that Tom Hay-
den rejected city funds in his upcoming bid for the Los Angeles city council be-
cause "[iut was a nightmare to get matching funds turned around in time to
pay for [his] mail in 1997").
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1. 1996 Massachusetts Campaign Between John Kerry and
William Weld
The 1996 senate race in Massachusetts pitted incumbent
Democratic Senator John Kerry against Republican Governor
William Weld. In August 1996, the two candidates entered into
an agreement to limit spending in their race.83 The agreement
capped total campaign spending after July 1 at $6.9 million.8
4
Of that total, media spending could only constitute $5 million
and the candidates could only use $500,000 of their personal
funds.85 Spending by outside groups such as unions, busi-
nesses, and other advocacy groups counted against the total
cap.86 Additionally, the political parties were limited to spend-
ing $600,000 on behalf of their candidates, and $2 million in
soft money spending in the race.
87
The agreement broke down in the closing days of the cam-
paign because of a disagreement about the application of the $5
million cap on media spending.88 Kerry insisted that the media
spending cap included the standard fifteen percent buyer's fee,
so that the amount spent on advertisements themselves was
only $4.25 million.89 Weld, who had negotiated buyer's fees at
half the standard rate, disagreed that the cap included the
standard fee.90 Kerry treated the agreement as breached when
Weld continued to spend money pursuant to Weld's under-
standing of the agreement. 91 Weld then brought an unsuccess-
ful suit in federal court to prevent Kerry from spending the
83. Alliance for Better Campaigns, Case Study: The 1996 Massachusetts
Senate Race, available at http'/www.bettercampaigns.org/documents/mass.




87. Id. Another version of that study has been cited as DOUGLAS G.
RIVLIN, DEBATES AND THE CANDIDATE AGREEMENT IN THE 1996 SENATE RACE
IN MASSACHUSETTS: A REPORT OF THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). Michael L. Berry, Note, Arkansas Edu-
cational Television Commission v. Forbes: Independent Candidate Access to
Public Television Debates, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1223, 1253 n.252 (1999).
88. Meg Vailancourt, Kerry-Weld Spending Cap Might Shatter Ceiling,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1996, at B4.
89. Frank Phillips, Deal to Limit Spending Breaks Down, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 24, 1996, at Al.
90. Id.
91. Meg Vaillancourt, Foe Ignores Spending Cap, Says Kerry Aide,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 1996, at B6.
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proceeds of a $400,000 loan that Kerry obtained using his home
as collateral, noting that Kerry had already spent the $500,000
of his own money permitted by their agreement. 92 The candi-
dates blamed each other for breaking the agreement.9 3 The
part of the agreement that included money spent by outside
groups was more effective.94 After all of the campaigning,
Kerry defeated Weld on election day to retain his seat.
95
2. 1998 Wisconsin Campaign Between Russell Feingold and
Mark Neumann
Two years later, incumbent Democratic Senator Russell
Feingold (a champion of campaign finance reform) and Repub-
lican Representative Mark Neumann entered into a broader
voluntary agreement in their Senate race in Wisconsin. 96 The
candidates agreed to campaign promises, including a one-dollar
per-voter spending cap, a limit of ten percent of their funds
raised from political action committees, a requirement that at
least seventy-five percent of their contributions come from
within Wisconsin, a prohibition on using more than $2000 of
their personal funds on the campaign, the reporting of all con-
tributions, and an agreement not to raise soft money.97 Neu-
mann allowed his party to. spend soft money on his behalf;
Feingold did not, much to the consternation of Democratic
Party officials. 98 Both candidates were aided by television ad-
vertisements paid for by outside groups advocating positions on
the environment, abortion and other issues.99 Neumann also
spent somewhat more than Feingold during 1998 because
92. Phillips, supra note 89, at Al.
93. Id.
94. See Alliance for Better Campaigns, supra note 83 (reporting that issue
advertising was marginalized).
95. MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 2000, at 774 (1999) (describing the outcome of the race between
Kerry and Weld).
96. Daniel Bice, Limits May Be Set in Senate Campaign, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 1998, at 1.
97. Feingold Senate Comm. 98, Ten Campaign Finance Promises from
Russ Feingold to the People of Wisconsin (letter detailing the promises that
had been posted on the campaign's web site) (on file with the author); Bice,
supra note 96, at 1; Alan J. Borsuk & Richard P. Jones, Senate Rivals Offer
Restraint in Campaign Spending, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 1998, at
1.
98. Alan J. Borsuk, Soft Money Floods TV in Feingold-Neumann Race,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 16, 1998, at 1.
99. Id.
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Neumann matched what Feingold had spent campaigning in
the past two years. 1°° The candidates abided by their agree-
ment without incident, and Wisconsin voters reelected Feingold
in a close race in November. 101
3. 2000 New York Campaign Between Hillary Rodham
Clinton and Rick Lazio
Most recently, and most famously, First Lady Hillary
Rodham Clinton and Representative Rick Lazio agreed to sev-
eral spending restrictions in their Senate campaign. 102 The
agreement was only reached after Lazio strode across the stage
during a debate and demanded that Clinton sign the agreement
that he was holding, which itself occurred months after Clinton
had proposed a voluntary agreement with her anticipated Re-
publican opponent Mayor Rudolph Guiliani.10 3 After much edi-
torial pressure and negotiation, Clinton and Lazio agreed that
they would not spend soft money on campaign advertise-
ments. 10 4 They also agreed to request twenty-six named out-
side groups not to use soft money for advertisements for or
against their preferred candidates. 10 5 Lazio had proposed that
any disputes about the agreement be arbitrated by campaign
finance leaders Senators McCain and Feingold, but Clinton in-
sisted that the public was capable of determining compliance
100. See Alan J. Borsuk, Neumann Outspent Feingold: Challenger and In-
cumbent Switched Expected Roles in Campaign for U.S. Senate, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 1998, at 3.
101. Id.
102. Dean E. Murphy, Candidates Back 'Soft Money' Ban in New York
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000, § 1, at 1.
103. Jim Drinkard & Kathy Kiely, Revolts Threaten Clinton-Lazio Cease-
Fire on Ads, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2000, at 6A
104. Id.
105. The groups supporting Clinton were the AFL-CIO, American Federa-
tion of Teachers, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Democratic Na-
tional Committee, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee, Liberal Party of New York, National
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, National Education Associa-
tion, New York State Democratic Party, Planned Parenthood, Sierra Club, and
Working Families Party. See Drinkard & Kiely, supra note 103, at 6A. The
groups supporting Lazio were The American Conservative Union, AmeriPAC,
Citizens for a Sound Economy, Coalition for a Better America, The Conserva-
tive Campaign Fund, The Conservative Leadership PAC, Conservatives for
Effective Leadership, ConserveAmerica, National Conservative Campaign
Fund, The Republican Jewish Coalition, The Republican National Committee,
The Republican Leadership Council, Ruf[PAC, and Save Our Senate. See id.
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with the agreement.10 6 The candidates agreed that the remedy
for any violations of the agreement was to permit a proportion-
ate response by the aggrieved candidate.
10 7
Initially, the targeted interest groups reacted negatively.
The Emergency Committee to Stop Hillary Rodham Clinton
protested that "[nlo campaign or party committee can direct
us";1 08 abortion rights activists were unwilling to "participate in
a campaign of silence."' 10 9 But soon all of the groups acquiesced
and agreed to abide by the agreement between Clinton and
Lazio. l" 0 The candidates engaged in a brief dispute about the
Republican Party's placing of an advertisement supporting La-
zio,"' but otherwise they adhered to their agreement
throughout the campaign. A study conducted by the Brennan
Center for Justice "found that the agreement ... was, in fact,
obeyed by both the Clinton and Lazio camps."112 Critics of the
agreement, however, described it as a "big-money shell game"
that allowed the candidates to spend their campaign funds on
television advertising while their political parties and other
groups used soft money to pay consultants and other election
expenses. 113 They also complained that the candidates, espe-
cially Clinton, spent lots of soft money just before reaching the
106. Murphy, supra note 102, § 1, at 1.
107. Id.
108. Drinkard & Kiely, supra note 105, at 6A (quoting Morton Blackwell,
Chairman of the Committee).
109. Juliet Eilperin, Clinton, Lazio Agree to Ban 'Soft Money' Ads, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 2000, at A5 (quoting Kate Michelman, President, National
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League); accord William Goldschlag
& Joel Siegel, Soft Money Deal in Doubt: Anti-Hil Group Derides Ban, Vows to
Run Ads Anyway, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 26, 2000, at 5 (quoting Kelli Conlin,
Executive Director, NARAL's New York branch, who described her organiza-
tion as "very conflicted" because "[ilssues of protecting reproductive freedom
and choice are equally [as] important as campaign finance reform"). For simi-
lar objections voiced by other listed groups, see Jay Gallagher, Reservations on
the Lazio-Clinton Soft-Money Pact, GANNETFr NEWS SERV., Sept. 27, 2000, at
ARC.
110. Brennan Center: Sen.-Elect Clinton Benefited From Huge Soft Money
Edge in NY Senate Campaign, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 14, 2000, available at
2000 WL 26852150.
111. Adam Nagourney & Edward Wong, Lazio Denies Ad Violated Cam-
paign-Financing Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, § 1, at 40.
112. Brennan Center, supra note 110; see also Hard Gains From Soft
Money, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 27, 2000, at 34 (concluding that "[elven in the
final, desperate hours of the campaign-with both sides exchanging wild
charges-the candidates refrained from breaking their pledge").
113. Robert Hardt, Jr., Clinton and Lazio Skirted Soft-$ Ban Here, N.Y.
POST, Jan. 4, 2001, at 9 (quoting a "Democrat, who asked not to be named").
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agreement.114 In any event, Clinton won the election hand-
ily.115
4. The 1998 White House Advisory Committee's Call for Five
Minutes of Daily Television Election Coverage
Candidates are not the only actors capable of addressing
common concerns about political campaigns. The cost and
quality of campaign advertisements has prompted numerous
campaign proposals addressed at television broadcasters. Most
recently, the 1998 report of the Advisory Committee on Public
Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters con-
tained three recommendations aimed at "improving the quality
of political discourse."'1 6 Two of those recommendations antici-
pated legislative or regulatory action." 7 The third recommen-
dation, though, stated that "[t]he television broadcasting indus-
try should voluntarily provide 5 minutes each night for
candidate-centered discourse in the thirty days before an elec-
tion."11
8
That recommendation was seized upon by the Alliance for
Better Campaigns, which established "GreedyTV.org" in Sep-
tember 2000 in an effort to shame television broadcasters into
improving their election coverage. 1 9 NBC, CBS, and several
114. E.g., Bob Port, She Spent Plenty Before Soft-Money Ban, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 1, 2000, at 4.
115. The Senate; Results by State, NAT'L J., Nov. 11, 2000, at 3620.
116. Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital Televi-
sion Broadcasters, Recommendation 6: Improving the Quality of Political Dis-
course (1998), available at http:/www.benton.org/PIAC/rec6/html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Recommendation 6]. Several committee members,
including Professor Cass Sunstein, argued against the effectiveness of volun-
tary standards, recommending instead that the Federal Communications
Commission should require television broadcasters to provide free time to po-
litical candidates. See Advisory Council on Public Interest Obligations of Digi-
tal Television Broadcasters, Statement of Charles Benton et al. (1998), avail-
able at http'J/www.benton.org/PIAC/piltr.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
117. Recommendation 6, supra note 116 (asking broadcasters to "do their
part to reform the role of television in campaigns" if Congress enacts campaign
finance reform, and recommending a legal prohibition on the refusal of broad-
casters to sell air time to state and local political candidates).
118. Id. (referring to Recommendation 6b).
119. See Alliance for Better Campaigns, News Release, National Grassroots
Coalition Launches GREEDYTV.ORG Campaign (Sept. 14, 2000), available at
http/vww.bettercampaigns.org/documents/rele9l400.htm. See generally Al-
liance for Better Campaigns, http'//greedytv.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2001)
(providing information on, "How TV Profiteers On Democracy-And What You
Can Do About It!").
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other broadcasters agreed to provide the requested five minutes
per night of candidate-centered election coverage.120 Their
commitment, however, only applied to the stations that the
networks owned themselves, not- to the network's affiliates
throughout the country. 121 ABC refused to make even that
commitment, thus prompting an exchange of nasty letters be-
tween the network and the Alliance for Better Campaigns.
122
The upshot was that only ninety-three of the nation's 1300
television stations agreed to the five minute recommenda-
tion. 123 And the stations that promised to provide the re-
quested five minutes often failed to do so. An Annenberg Pub-
lic Policy Center study conducted after the election found that
"[n] one of the networks provided the recommended five minutes
a night of candidate-centered discourse during the 30 days be-
fore the primary and general elections."
124
5. The 1996 Minnesota Compact
The most comprehensive effort to promote voluntary cam-
paign finance reform efforts occurred in Minnesota in 1996.
The Minnesota Compact asked candidates, the media, and the
public to abide by several specific principles guiding their cam-
paign activities. 125 The compact contained provisions for clean
campaign advertisements, frequent debates, media coverage
emphasizing substantive issues instead of portraying the cam-
paign as a "horse race," and the active participation of inter-
ested citizens. 126 The compact was agreed to by 283 candidates
for elective offices throughout the state, though neither incum-
bent Senator Paul Wellstone nor his unsuccessful challenger
120. See Alliance for Better Campaigns, News Release, NBC Stations Join
CBS in Nightly Commitment to Candidate Discourse (Oct. 4, 2000), available
at http://www.bettercampaigns.org.documents/relel0400.htm.
121. See id. (listing NBC's "13 owned-and-operated" stations).
122. See Alliance for Better Campaigns, http://greedytv.org (last visited
Mar. 3, 2001) (providing a link to the letters).
123. Alliance for Better Campaigns, News Release, TV Broadcasters Have
Ignored Voluntary Standard to Provide Viewers with Candidate Issue Discus-
sion, Taylor Says at FCC Hearing (Oct. 16, 2000), available at
http'//www.bettercampaigns.org/documents/rele101600.htm.
124. Erika Falk & Sean Aday, Annenberg Public Policy Center, Are Volun-
tary Standards Working? Candidate Discourse on Network Evening News
Programs (Dec. 20, 2000), available at http'//www.appcpenn.org/Candidate_
Discourse/2000-general-report-final.htm.
125. JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA & MARK BREWIN, THE MINNESOTA COMPACT
AND THE ELECTION OF 1996, at 3 (1998).
126. Id. at 27-29 (reproducing the provisions of the Compact).
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Rudy Boschwitz signed onto the compact. 127 A subsequent An-
nenberg Center evaluation of the compact concluded that the
candidates who agreed to the Compact generally adhered to its
terms.128 The study also complimented the state's media both
for its substantive coverage and for its critical appraisal of the
campaign advertisements aired by the candidates.
2 9
Of course, these are not the only five attempts at voluntary
campaign finance reform. Other candidates, interest groups,
and media outlets have reached a variety of similar agree-
ments.130 But the obvious fact remains that such agreements
are the exception, not the rule. For each of the Senate races in
the past three election years in which the candidates and their
supporters entered into a voluntary agreement, there were
more than thirty other Senate races in which no agreement was
reached.
Remember, though, that a candidate or television station
need not wait for a competitor to restrict spending, provide free
air time, or engage in other desired reforms. Senator Feingold
showed in 1998 that a candidate can win even if he refuses his
party's soft money while his opponent accepts such funds.
Likewise, in 1997 the Democratic National Committee decided
not to accept soft money contributions of more than $100,000 or
to accept any contributions from permanent resident aliens,
though both restrictions lasted less than two years. 131 But the
specter of such "unilateral disarmament" in the fundraising
wars has scared off other candidates and groups from repeating
Feingold's feat. 132 Even Senator Wellstone, the sponsor of a
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id. at 9 (indicating that there were only five or six violations among
the 283 signatories of the compact).
129. Id. at 17-23 (noting specific instances of state media coverage).
130. See, e.g., NATIONAL CIVIL LEAGUE, THE NEW POLITICS PROGRAM:
RECOGNIZING AND PROMOTING INNOVATIVE POLITICAL REFORM (2001), avail-
able at http'//www.ncl.org/NClinppsum.htm (Mar. 3, 2001) (describing a vol-
untary reform program instituted for municipal elections in Chapel Hill); Todd
C. Frankel, Hunt, Sprouse Pledge Truce After 'One Day of Craziness Negative
Ads by Both Candidates To Be Taken Off TV, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Nov.
2, 2000, at 7A (describing an agreement between two candidates for the county
commission not to spend more than $135,000).
131. See DNC Lifts Ban on Noncitizens' Donations, FACTS ON FILE, WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, Mar. 26, 1998, at 190.
132. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 81, at A15 (reporting that a candidate for
a city office in San Francisco "doesn't believe in unilateral disarmament");
Gore Offers to Abandon "Soft Money," U.P.I., Sept. 27, 2000 (quoting Vice
President Gore's spokesman Chris Lehane's insistence that "[wle're not going
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clean elections bill to replace private campaign funding with
government financing, 133 had declined to heed calls to voluntar-
ily forego soft money during his 1996 race.
134
The experience with purely voluntary agreements to date
suggests several lessons for the efficacy of that approach to the
many concerns about political campaigns and campaign fi-
nance. First, candidates will not enter into agreements that
they regard as a ploy advanced by desperate challengers. Indi-
ana Senator Richard Lugar never bothered to respond to his
opponent's proposed voluntary fundraising agreement in
2000,135 presumably because Lugar correctly realized that his
reelection was in little doubt. Nor did wealthy New Jersey
Senate candidate Jon Corzine accept his Republican challenger
Bob Franks's call for a voluntary spending limit of $1.5 million
on election day alone.136 Second, candidates must believe that
they retain adequate funding before they will enter into an
agreement restricting the fundraising or spending. Third, any
agreements must be precise. The breakdown of the Kerry-Weld
agreement illustrates the consequences of imprecise agree-
ments. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the conse-
quences of breaking an agreement-or of failing to enter into
an agreement in the first place-must be sufficiently compel-
ling to persuade candidates, interest groups, television broad-
casters, and others to abide campaign restrictions even when
the law does not require it. Those are the circumstances in
which purely voluntary agreements can offer a helpful contri-
bution to the ongoing debate about campaign finance.
CONCLUSION
Optimism abounds among traditional campaign finance re-
formers at the beginning of the 107th Congress. The results of
to disarm unilaterally").
133. Clean Money, Clean Elections Act, S. 982, 106th Cong. (1999).
134. See Craig Gilbert, Feingold-Neumann Race Looks Like a Campaign
Classic, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 25, 1998, at 1 (reporting that Wellstone
"rejected the Feingold path of 'unilateral disarmament' in his own re-election
bid, shaking the money tree for more than $7 million despite his longtime re-
formist stance").
135. See Campaign Press Release, Johnson Campaign Surpasses Million-
Dollar Mark (July 10, 2000), available at http'//www.davidjohnson2000.com/
page42.html (noting that Senator Lugar never replied to Democratic candidate
David Johnson's challenge to limit campaign spending to $2.5 million).
136. See Maria Newman & Robert Hanley, Election Day Spending Cap at
Issue in Tight Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at B6.
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the 2000 Senate election provide hope to supporters of the
McCain-Feingold bill-now the McCain-Feingold-Cochran
bill-and states continue to push ahead of the federal govern-
ment in adopting sweeping reform measures. The history of
the past thirty years teaches, however, that the enactment of
campaign finance reforms, and the approval of any such legis-
lation by the courts, should not be casually assumed to be in-
evitable. The history also shows that every law has yielded un-
intended consequences that keep reformers always a step
behind in their battle against monetary influence and other
campaign tactics. In short, do not expect the law to make this
problem go away.
Voluntary campaign finance reform offers a useful alterna-
tive. It does not need to survive the many obstacles to the en-
actment of legislation. It is more flexible than legal regulations
because voluntary agreements can be adapted to the specific
circumstances of any particular campaign. It treats changed
campaigns as an immediate possibility rather than a distant
goal. The obstacles to relying upon voluntary agreements in-
stead of the threat of legal sanction should not be minimized,
but the obstacles to the enactment and enforcement of cam-
paign finance laws must be remembered as well. Fear of elec-
toral retribution might even be a stronger incentive for candi-
date compliance than the threat of enforcement of campaign
finance laws by the FEC.
But voluntary reform, like campaign finance legislation,
will only occur if people want it. After Clinton and Lazio
reached their agreement, Senator McCain proclaimed that the
agreement "should be followed by every federal campaign in
America."137 None did. And the New York Times editorialized
that "[o]f course if voters did not care, Mr. Lazio and Mrs. Clin-
ton would not have done this deal."1 38 Perhaps so, although
Clinton's own remark that "there are not many New York vot-
ers who believe [soft money] is an important issue'" raises ques-
tions about the reasons why the candidates struck their agree-
ment. 39 But if the existence of the agreement demonstrates
that voters in New York do in fact care enough about campaign
finance reform to demand such action, what does that say
137. Senate Report New York: Vegas Odds on the Ban Lasting, AMERICAN
POLITICAL NETWORK, THE HOTLINE, Sept. 26, 2000, at 2.
138. A Soft-Money Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at A22.
139. Lazio, Hillary Evaluate Fund-Raising Deal (ABC news broadcast,
Sept., 25, 2000) (quoting Clinton's remarks at a press conference).
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about the voters in other states where no such agreements ma-
terialized? Likewise, the lack of public support for governmen-
tally induced campaign finance agreements is demonstrated by
the fact that only one in eight taxpayers commit to paying three
dollars annually for the presidential campaign fund.14 0 Such
facts remind us that voluntary campaign finance reform, like
campaign finance legislation, will occur only when the People
really want it.
140. See John M. Broder & James Dao, Donors Wary of Gore's Plan on Fi-
nancing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at Al; see also NEUBORNE, supra note 42,
at 14 (lamenting that only eight percent of Wisconsin residents participate in
the state's campaign financing scheme).
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